The Present Legal Status of the Private Seal in West Virginia by Billig, Thomas Clifford & Wunschel, William Frederick
Volume 40 Issue 4 Article 3 
June 1934 
The Present Legal Status of the Private Seal in West Virginia 
Thomas Clifford Billig 
West Virginia University College of Law 
William Frederick Wunschel 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas C. Billig & William F. Wunschel, The Present Legal Status of the Private Seal in West Virginia, 40 
W. Va. L. Rev. (1934). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol40/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ 
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research 
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
THE PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF THE PRIVATE SEAL
IN WEST VIRGINIA
THOMAS CLIFFORD BILLIG*
Wm mi FREDERICK WUNSCHEL
0 0
Introduction
For many years there has been much discussion of both the
legal effect of the private seal in West Virginia and of the desir-
ability of its further use. In fact more than thirty years ago an
editorial in The Bar,1 official publication of the West Virginia Bar
Association, observed that "it is not unusual to hear the casual
suggestion made that the private seal as used in this state has
ceased to be of any value. It is a mere relic of antiquity which
has outlived its usefulness. Worse than that, it occasionally makes
unnecessary trouble without any corresponding advantage."
If this statement had any significance at the time of its pub-
lication, it certainly is all the more pertinent today, in view of the
intervening statutory changes. It has been reasoned, for example,
that, since the need for a seal has been dispensed with by statute
in "any instrument conveying or agreeing to convey land, or any
interest whatever in land,' (the most formal and solemn instru-
ments known to the law), then, a fortiori, the seal should have no
legal effect whatever if attached to some type of document for
which the law has less solicitude. And while this attempt at logic
may run afoul of the time honored principle that "statutes in
derogation of the common law should be strictly construed," '
nevertheless, there are those who believe that the private seal has
no more legal significance in West Virginia today than it has in
those states where the seal has been abolished by statute.'
In view of this apparent confusion, and also of the fact that
the Supreme Court of Appeals has stamped the sealing of writ-
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
**Secretary of the Student Board of Editors, West Virginia Law
Quarterly.
1 (1898) 5 THE BAR 146.
2W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 3, §§ 1, 3.
3 Most courts will not enlarge by construction the terms of a statute that
is in derogation of the common law. Carter v. Reserve Gas Co., 84 W. Va.
741, 100 S. E. 738 (1919); Bank of Weston v. Thomas, 75 W. Va. 321, 83
S. E. 985 (1914); Harrison, Adm'r v. Leach, 4 V. Va. 383 (1870).
'As, for example, in Ohio or Kentucky. OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1931)
§ 32; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 471.
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ten instruments as a "senseless custom",' the time seems appro-
priate for an investigation of statute and case law in order to de-
termine, if possible, first, just what is the legal effect of the private
seal in West Virginia today, and, second, what need for the pri-
vate seal, if any, still exists in the state. In this connection four
topics will be discussed: (1) the formal requisites of the seal;
(2) the legal effect of the seal upon agreements to convey land and
instruments actually conveying an interest in land; (3) the legal
effect of the seal upon writings purporting to make gifts of per-
sonal property and upon other contracts; (4) the problem of con-
sideration in sealed instruments.
Formal Requisites of the Sear
Lord Coke described the seal as used in his day to be wax
upon which an impression had been made, and the wax without
the impression was no seal.' The reason for using a piece of wax
in order to identify the maker of the instrument to which it was
attached is, of course, elementary learning to any student of legal
history." In mediaeval England only a few persons except the
clergy were able to write and consequently the impression left by
the signet ring of the covenantor (on which was engraved his coat
of arms) was a convenient means of determining his identity.
Then, too, the making of a sealed instrument was deemed to be a
most solemn occasion. There was a certain ritualistic significance
attached to the act of impressing the signet ring in the soft wax.
Consequently - long before any legal sanction was given to a
GWilliams, J. in Pardee v. Johnston, 70 W. Va. 347, 351, 74 S. E. 721
(1912): "The custom of sealing written instruments originated at a time
when few men could write, and when they used stamps to make impressions
upon wax, technically called a seal, instead of writing their names, and, not-
withstanding the reason for the custom no longer exists, the law continues
the senseless custom."
(13 COKE, INST. 169. "Sigillum est cera impressa, quia cera sine impres-
sioine non est sigillun"
7This paper has not attempted to make an exhaustive study of the history
of sealed instruments. The following source materials are of interest in this
connection: 5 WmMORE, EVIDENCE (1932) § 2426; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(1920) c. VII; 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1923) 417
et seq.; AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 98-99; COaBIN, CASES ON
CONTRACTs (2d ed. 1933) c. 3; COSTIGAN, CASES ON TME LAW OF CONTRACTS-
(2d ed. 1932) c. 1; Crane, The Magic of the Private Seal (1915) 15 COL. L
REv. 24, reprinted in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931)
598; Reeve, The Uniform Written Obligations Act (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 580, reprinted in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931)
614; Backus, The Origin and Use of Private Seals Under the Common Law,
(1917) 51 Am. L. REv. 369; Decker, The Case of the Sealed Instrument in
Illinois (1917) 1 ILL. L. BULL. 65, 138.
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simple promise - the common law enforced promises, or covenants,
in writings "signed, sealed, and delivered."
However, as time passed, the requirement of the wax gradually
was relaxed and a "wafer" or some "other tenacious substance"
upon which an impression might be made eventually came to be
recognized as a valid seal.' The impression, however, apparently
was still essential and the fact that an impression had been made
was required to be determined by inspection.!
It was at this period in the history of the seal that the Amer-
ican state courts divided on the question of what may constitute
a valid seal. One line of authority limited strictly the departure
from "the impression on wax" to the aforementioned wafer -
"the seal should be a comnmon-law seal, or, at least, by analogy, a
seal impressed upon paper, or a paper affixed as a seal." 1  Ac-
cordingly, we find language in the decisions, such as that employed
by Chancellor Kent in Warren v. Lynch,u denying validity as seals
to scrolls or scrawls:
"A scrawl with a pen is not a seal, and deserves no
notice. The law has not, indeed, declared of what precise
materials the wax shall consist; and whether it be a wafer or
any other paste or matter sufficiently tenacious to adhere and
receive an impression, is perhaps not material. But the
scrawl has no one property of a seal .... To adopt it as such
""Anciently a seal was defined to be an impression on wax; but it has
long been held, that a seal by a wafer, or other tenacious substance,, upon
which an impression is or may be made, is a valid seal; and such is the seal
objected to, upon which an impression not only may be, but was, actually
made." Wilde, J., in Tasker v. Bartlett, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 359, 364 (1850).
""In process of time, other materials than wax were used, but the im-
pression seems still to have been considered as important, and its existence
was still to be tried by inspection." Tucker, J. in Cromwell v. Tate's Exec.
7 Leigh (Va.) 301, 304 (1836).
"0Providence Telegram Publishing Co. v. Crahan Engraving Co., 24 R. I.
175, 176, 177, 52 Atl. 804 (1902) (written word "seal" within scrolls held
no seal); McLaughlin v. Randall, 66 le. 226, 227 (1877); Bishop v. Globe
Co., 135 Mass. 132 (1883) (the word "seal" written or printed between
brackets held insufficient); Beardsley v. Knight, 4 Vt. 471 (1832) (written
word "seal" held insufficient). The form of corporate seals also was re-
stricted. In Bates v. New York Central R. Co., 10 Allen (Mass.) 251 (1865)
the court held insufficient in law a facsimile of the seal of a corporation
printed upon a blank form at the same time that the remainder of the blank
was printed. But in Royal Bank of Liverpool v. Grand Junction R. R. &
Depot Co., 100 Mass. 444 (1868) the indented impression of a corporate seal
on a bond was held to be a valid seal in law.
See Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. (U. S.) 472, 14 L. Ed. 228 (1851) in which
the Supreme Court held that the indented impression of a public seal made
on paper by a machine was a valid seal.
n 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 238, 245 (1810). Similar language appears in 4 KENT'S
CommEExARiEs, *452, 453. For the subsequent history of the seal in New
York, see Crane up. cit. supra n. 7.
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would be at once to abolish the immemorial distinction between
writings sealed and writings not sealed. Forms will fre-
quently, and especially when they are consecrated by time and
usage, become substance. The calling a paper a deed will
not make it one, if it want the requisite formalities".
The other group of states, which included Virginia, went much
further in giving legal validity as seals to such written and printed
devices as the word SEAL appearing after the name of the cov-
enantor, to the letters L. S. (locus sigilli), to various other kinds
of scrolls and even to scrawls.' The limit of informality probably
was reached in Hacker's Appeal,' a Pennsylvania decision which
held that a dash one eighth of an inch long constituted a valid seal
when preceded by a testimoniunm clause.
Mention has been made of the liberality of the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia in giving legal sanction as seals to written
or printed scrolls. The Virginia Code of 1849 provided :"
"Any writing to which the person making it shall affix
a scroll by way of seal, shall be of the same force as if it were
actually sealed."
This same section was included in the Virginia Code of 1860,'
but was omitted from the West Virginia Code of 1868. Drafts-
men of the latter code substituted the following provision:"
"When the seal of a natural person is required to a
paper, he may affix thereto a scroll by way of seal, or adopt as
his seal any scroll, written, printed or engraved, made thereon
by another."
This section has remained in the statute law of West Virginia
until the present time.'7 It was retained as part of Section 6 of
Chapter 2, Article 2 of the Revised Code of 1931.
There are several West Virginia decisions which consider the
question of what constitutes a sufficient seal within the meaning of
1Jones & Temple v. Logwood, 1 Wash. (Va.) 43, 44 (1791) ("Scrolls have
long since been substituted for seals in this country"); Hastings v. Vaughn,
5 Cal. 315 (1855) (the word "seal" written after the name of the grantor
of a deed); Williams v. Greer, 12 Ga. 459 (1852) (ink scrolls with the word
"seal" written within); Long v. Ramsay, 1 S. & R. (Pa.) 71 (1814) (a
flourish made by a pen after the signature); Eames v. Preston, 20 I1. 389
(a pair of brackets without any words or letters to identify the purpose).
"3121 Pa. 192, 15 Atl. 500 (1888).
14 0. 143, § 2.
'30. 143, § 2.
"10. 13, § 15.
17See Keller's Adm'r v. McHuffman, 15 W. Va. 64, 77 (1879).
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the statute. In Hawkinberry v. Metz,'8 for example, the instrument
sued on purported to be a deed of conveyance with covenants of gen-
eral warranty. The deed concluded with the words "witness the
following signature and seal." Then came the name of the grantor
followed by five hyphens. The court, in holding the instrument
properly sealed under provisions of the Code, observed in the
course of its opinion."
"This provision would seem to allow the grantor to adopt
almost any kind of a scroll or mark, written or printed, as his
seal. "
The same tendency to construe the statute broadly was ob-
served in Pardee v .Johnston' In that case a grantor concluded
his deed by stating that he had "hereunto set his hand and seal."
He then signed his name and placed below his signature a scroll
made by his pen. The deed was held to be properly sealed.'
In considering the formal requisites of the seal two further
matters should be noticed. The first concerns the question as to
whether a recitation in the instrument that it is sealed is required
to make the writing a valid specialty. The several states have not
been in accord on this point. New York, for example, has held
that such a recitation is necessary regardless of the type of seal
used. ' Missouri required the recitation in the case of a scroll or
scrawl ' but not in the case of a common law seal." Maryland
-91 W. Va. 637, 114 S. E. 240 (1922).
19 Ibid at 639.
70 W. Va. 347, 74 S. E. 721 (1912).
"One of the definitions of the word ' scroll' given in Webster's Diction-
ary is a 'flourish, tracing, mark or design used in place of a seal,/ " said the
court, per Williams, J., ibid at 351.
However, a declaration in the body of an instrument to the effect that it is
sealed is not enough in the absence of any mark whatever after the signature.
Comley v. Ford, 65 W. Va. 429, 435, 64 S. E. 447 (1909).
In Thomas v. Linn, 40 W. Va. 122, 127, 20 S. E. 878 (1894) the court
said: "The instrument in this case set up by plaintiff is a bond, or, more
properly, a single bill, being under seal - having a scroll affixed thereto
by way of a seal which is recognized as such in the body of the instrument
..... It is a specialty, and therefore non-negotiable by our decisions."
Other decisions which consider the question of what form a seal may take
in West Virginia are Miller v. Holt, 47 W. Va. 7, 10, 34 S. E. 956 (1899);
Cosner v. McCrum, 40 W. Va. 339, 346, 21 S. E. 739 (1895); Keller v. Mc-
Huffman, 15 W. Va. 64, 69, 85 (1879) ; Norvell v. Walker, 9 W. Va. 447, 450
(1876).
'Matter of Pirie, 198 N. Y. 209, 91 N. E. 587 (1910).
IAlt v. Stoker, 127 Mo. 466, 30 S. W. 132 (1895) ; Walker v. Keile, 8 Mo.
301 (1843); Grimsley v. Administrators of Riley, 5 Mo. 280 (1837); Cart-
mill v. Hopkins, 2 Mo. 220 (1830).
2Dingee v. Kearney, 2 Mo. App. 515, 525 (1876).
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took the view that the recitation was unnecessary.' Upon first
reading, the Virginia cases, which form the foundation of West
Virginia law on the point, appear to be in utter confusion. If any
rationalization of them is possible, it probably is this. If the in-
strument under consideration was of a type required by law to be
sealed (a deed, for example), no acknowledgment or recitation of
the seal in the body of the instrument was necessary.' But, if the
instrument was of a kind not required by law to be sealed (a con-
tract for the sale of chattels, for example), then the maker would
have to acknowledge the seal in the body of the instrument in
order to give legal validity to the sealing.'
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recognized
the foregoing Virginia classification. In Cosner v. McCrumn the
court, per English, J., makes the following observation :
..... and while it is true that our statute .... provides that
'when the seal of a natural person is required to a paper, he
Trasher v. Everhart, 3 G. & J. (Md.) 234, 246 (1831). Contracts Re-
statement (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 100 provides: "A recital of the sealing or of
the delivery of a written promise is not essential to its validity as a sealed
contract. " I
nParks v. Hewlett, 9 Leigh (Va.) 511 (1838). The case involved an
instrument of emancipation for certain slaves which could be effected only
by a deed. The instrument had been recorded. The court said at 517: "It
could not have been legally admitted to record as an instrument of eman-
cipation, unless the witnesses swore that it was sealed, as well as acknowledged
and delivered, in their presence. These circumstances amount at least to
prima facie evidence that the instrument was duly sealed, and greatly out-
weigh the single presumption arising from the fact that no notice is taken
of it in the body of the writing."y Accord: Ashwell v. Ayres, 4 Gratt. (Va.)
283 (1848). This decision concerned an instrunent to convey land which
had a scroll attached to the grantor's signature. "The scroll was not
recognized as a seal either in the body of the instrument or in the attestation
clause, but the paper had been acknowledged in court by the grantor as his
deed and admitted to record. It was held that such acknowledgment was a
sufficient recognition of the scroll as a seal to make the instrument a deed."
See also, II MoR, INSTITUTE, 835 (4th ed. 1891).
- Clegg v. Lemessurier, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 108 (1859), reviewing previous
Virginia cases. See also note to Clegg v. Lemessurier. In Bucner v. Mackey,
2 Leigh (Va.) 488 (1831) a bond in printed form containing printed stamps
or scrolls by way of seals, with a recital of sealing in the body of the in-
strument was held to be a specialty. But in Baird & Briggs v. Blaigrove, 1
Wash. (Va.) 170 (1793) an agreement of guaranty, with scrolls opposite each
signature but no recital of sealing, was held to be a simple contract. In
Bradley Salt Co. v. Norfolk Importing and Exporting Co., 95 Va. 461, 28
S. E. 567 (1897) the Supreme Court of Appeals stretched the doctrine of
Clegg v. Lemessurier to cover a case in which an actual seal of a corporation
instead of a scrawl was involved. The plaintiff sued in covenant on the writ-
ing. The defendant demurred to the declaration on the ground that the
writing sued on was not a sealed instrument. A decision sustaining the de-
murrer was affirmed.
40 W. Va. 339, 21 S. E. 739 (1895),
Ibid at 345, 346,
6
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may affix thereto a scroll by way of seal or adopt as his seal
any scroll, written, printed or engraved, made thereon by
another,' a distinction appears to exist between instruments
which are not required to be acknowledged and recorded and
those that are only to be signed and sealed. Where the latter
do not recognize the scroll or seal in the body of the instru-
ment, the weight of authority is that such papers are not
sealed instruments. where, however, a scroll is annexed to the
signature of a paper purporting to be a deed, and the word
'seal' is written within the scroll, and said writing is properly
acknowledged and admitted to record, it must be regarded as
a deed, although the scroll or seal are not recognized in the
body of the instrument."
Accordingly, in Cosner v. Mcrumm a paper purporting to
convey certain real estate as a gift from a husband to his wife was
held to be a valid deed in equity, although the seal of the grantor
was not recognized in the body of the instrument. The instrument,
however, was duly acknowledged for record by the grantor.'
The second and final question to be considered in this division
of our study is whether the maker of an instrument may adopt as
his own the seal of his co-maker. As already noted,' the West
Virginia statute provides that one may "adopt as his seal any
scroll, written, printed or engraved, made thereon by another."
The liberal views of the Supreme Court of Appeals on this point
are contained in the following statement from the opinion in Par-
dee v. Jo1nston :
"It will be observed .... that the statute does not require
the scroll to have any particular form, or to be placed at any
particular point with respect to the name of the party adopt-
ing it. A scroll appearing immediately after the name of one
person may be adopted by another whose name may appear
on the instrument below the first name."
Thus, in Norvell v. Walker" the parties entered into a written
agreement which concluded with the words, "witness the follow-
ing signatures and seals." A scroll appeared after Walker's
w Ibid.
'Accord: Smith v. Henning, 10 W. Va. 596, 632 (1877) (deed conveying
land). See language in Comley v. Ford, supra n. 21. No West Virginia case
squarely in point was found involving a sealed instrument where the seal
had not been acknowledged in the body and where it was necessary to ack-
nowledge and record the instrument in order to give it full legal validity.
See Keller's Adm'r v. MeHuffman, supra n. 17 at 78.
W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 2, arft. 2, § 6.
"70 W. Va. 347, 351, 74 S. E. 721 (1912), per Williams, J.
9 W. Va. 447 (1876).
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name. Norvell's name was signed directly under Walker's, but no
scroll followed it. It was held that the one scroll must be taken as
the adopted seal of both parties to the agreement. However, in
Keller's Adm'r v. McHuffmane a promissory note concluded with
the words "as witness my hand and seal the 1st day of March,
1862. Thomas McHuffman, (Seal)" and below appeared the name
of the surety without a seal. The instrument was held to be a
single bill obligatory as to the maker but only a promissory note
as to the surety. The court apparently was not satisfied of any
intention on the part of the surety to seal, in the absence of evi-
dence to this effect either in the instrument itself or in the circum-
stances surrounding its making.
The Legal Effect of the Seal upon Agreements to Convey Land
and Instruments Actually Conveying an Interest in Land
Although the term "deed" technically may describe any
writing signed, sealed, and delivered,' for purposes of this paper
we shall confine its use to instruments conveying any interest in
land, in freehold or inheritance, or for a term of more than five
years.' Futhermore, it will not be necessary to distinguish be-
tween the several kinds of conveyances that require deeds in West
Virginia, nor to differentiate between deeds of lease and deeds of
conveyance. The reason for this lumping together of various types
of instruments relating to land will appear presently.
Before considering the West Virginia statutes affecting seals
on instruments purporting to convey land, a word should be said
concerning the common law rules of the Virginias in this connec-
tion. Clearly, prior to the statutory changes in 1921, a West Vir-
ginia deed without a seal was incapable of passing legal title to
lands.' This fundamental rule was thus stated long ago by Judge
,See Keller's Adm'r v. McHuffman, supra n. 17 at 86. Quaere, Whether
the not in this case would not have been held to have been sealed by both
maker and surety had the acknowledgment read "witness our hands and
,seals" instead of "witness my hand and seal"l "Whether it should be
otherwise if the writing said 'witness our hands'. I do not now say anything
as I conceive that question does not arise here," said the court.
American Buttonhole, etc. Co. v. Burlack, 35 W. Va. 647, 652, 14 S. E.
319 (1891).
3W. VA. REy. CoDE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 1, provides: "No estate of
inheritance or freehold, or for a term of more than five years, in lands, or
any other interest or term therein of any duration under which the whole or
any part of the corpus of the estate may be taken, destroyed, or consumed,
except for domestic use, shall be created or conveyed unless by deed or will." I
23Boggess v. Scott, 48 W. Va. 316, 321, 37 S. E. 661 (1900). See also
cases cited in n. 41 infra. In Atkinson v. Miller, 34 W. Va. 115, 117, 11 S.
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [1934], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol40/iss4/3
PRIVATE SEAL IN WEST VIRGINIA
Baldwin of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Pollack
& wife v. Glassell:?
"A seal is essential in the conveyance of the title to real
estate - it excludes the bar of the statute of limitations -
it is indispensable to bind the heirs of the party - it gives a
priority in the administration of assets, and in various respects
it effects the rules of evidence and the forms of action and
pleading."
As noted previously, such clearly was the West Virginia rule
also as far as the law side of the court was concerned." In equity
the unsealed instrument was regarded as a contract to convey, on
which specific performance would be decreed by ordering the
grantor to execute a conveyance capable of passing legal title."
Virginia and West Virginia leases also, when given for a
period of more than five years, were required by statute to be by
deed, thus placing such instruments under seal.3 This statutory
provision ran counter to the common law rule in other jurisdictions,
a rule which did not require a sealed instrument in order to create
a valid term for years.'
In 1921 the West Virginia Legislature passed a statute which
virtually cast into the discard all the learning of the Virginias
with respect to seals on instruments involving real estate. This
statute provided:"
"That the affixing of what has been known as a private
seal, or scroll in lieu thereof, or the word 'seal' by any nat-
E. 1007 (1890) the court, per Brannon, J., said: "Suppose a deed for a fee
were executed without a seal. It would not pass the legal estate; for our
statute provides that no estate in land, greater than a term of five years,
shall pass except by deed or will".
2 Gratt. (Va.) 440, 453 (1846).
,0 See n. 38 suprm.
"Garten v. Layton, 76 W. Va. 63, 84 S. E. 1058 (1915) ; Atkinson v. Miller,
supra n. 38, holding that "a paper made for a deed of trust conveying land
to secure a debt, signed by the grantor but without a seal, though not
effectual as a deed of trust at law, is an equitable mortgage enforceable in
equity, and may be recorded ... . and when recorded is a lien valid against
subsequent purchasers and creditors." This case overruled Pratt & Fox v.
Clemens, 4 W. Va. 443 (1871) and Shattuck v. Knight, 25 W. Va. 590, 601
(1885).
' W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 1, this statute was carried throughfrom the Virginia Codes of 1849 (c. 116, § 1) and 1860 (c. 116, § 1) and
from the West Virginia Code of 1868. Comley v. Ford, 65 W. Va. 429, 64 S.
E. 447 (1909) (instrument without seal purporting to assign an oil and gas
lease for the term of twelve years, held to be no deed); Onyx & Marble Co.
v. Miller, 74 W. Va. 686, 82 S. E. 1078 (1914).
'Calkins v. Pierce, 112 Me. 474, 92 Atl. 529 (1914); Hunt v. Hazelton, 5
N. H. 216 (1830).
"1 Acts of 1921, c. 71, § 2.
9
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ural person hereafter to any deed, trust deed, mortgage, lease,
bond, or other writing, conveying, selling or agreeing to sell,
leasing, renting or encumbering any real estate, shall not give
thereto any additional force or effect; and the omission of any
such seal, word or scroll, shall in no way detract from the
legal effect of any such deed, trust deed, mortgage, lease, bond
or other writing, and every estoppel, covenant and warranty
contained therein or created thereby, shall be as binding, and
may be applied and enforced, as if contained in or created by
deed or other such writing under seal."
The Revisers of the Official Code of 1931, in Chapter 36,
Article 3, Section 1, simplified the foregoing section to read as
follows:'
"The affixing of a seal, or any symbol or word intended
to have the effect of a seal, shall not be necessary to give
validity to any deed, trust deed, mortgage, or other convey-
ance of an estate of inheritance or freehold in land, or any
estate of any duration therein."
The Revisers, in Section 3 of the same article, incorporated
that part of the Act of 1921 which provided that the affixing of a
seal to any instrument conveying or agreeing to convey land should
have no legal effect whatsover.' And in Section 2 they provided
that the action of covenant might be maintained on any written
conveyance or lease which must be by deed.'7
,W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 3, § 1. The Revisers' Note to this
section reads: "Section 2, c. 71, Acts 1921 (§ 26, c. 72, Code, 1923), limited
the effect of that act to natural persons, thus excluding corporations. Since
the law is that a corporation 'may contract and be contracted with, by sim-
ple contract or specialty' (§ 3, art. 1, c. 31), it would seem that corporations
and natural persons should be placed upon the same ground, with reference to
their conveyances.
"Said § 2, Act of 1921, mentioned bonds and writings 'agreeing to sell',
etc., real estate. Since such writings were not required, before the Acts of
1921, to be sealed, the inclusion of such writings in the act has caused some
confusion, for example, by apparently broadening the scope of the action
of covenant (See Acts 1921, c. 71, § 3, CoDE 1923, c. 72, § 27) to include un-
sealed agreements to convey, and leases for less than five years, upon which
the action of covenant could not have been maintained, before the Acts of
1921, if they had been unsealed. Such a result was probably not intended
by the legislature, and is avoided by the revision."
"Section 3 reads: " I The affixing of a seal, or any symbol or word intended
to have the effect of a seal, to any instrument conveying or agreeing to con-
vey land, or any interest whatever in land, shall not give to such instrument
any additional force or effect, either by way of importing a consideration or
in any other manner whatsoever, either at law, or in equity, than such in-
strument would have if it were unsealed".
'Section 2 reads: "An action of covenant may be maintained on any
written conveyance or lease which, under the provision of section one, article
one of this chapter, must be by deed, and which has been executed since the
twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred and twenty-one, for the breach
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Stated in summary fashion, the combined legal effect of these
several sections of Chapter 36 is to dispense entirely with the
necessity for a seal in the conveyance of any interest in land for
a term of more than five years, whether by deed or by lease, and
in contracts to convey interests of similar duration. In regard
to leases for five years or less, and agreements to make such leases,
all incidents of the seal likewise are dispensed with, except that
a seal is still essential in order to maintain an action of covenant."
The Legal Effect of the Seal Upon Writings Purporting to Make
Gifts of Personal Property and Upon Other Kinds of Contracts
As considered in a previous division of this discussion, the
statutory thrusts at the life of the private seal in West Virginia
have been confined principally to sealed instruments employed in
real estate transactions. Let us look for a moment now at the
situation with respect to personal property and, for purposes of
this discussion, personalty will refer to tangibles - goods and
chattels. Only one statute was found in this connection. The
Revised Code of 1931" provides that "No seal shall be necessary
to give validity to a gift of goods or chattels by writing .... "
This sentence is contained in a section of the Code which also
provides that "No gift of any goods or chattels shall be valid
unless made by writing, signed by the donor or his agent, or by
will, or unless actual possession shall have come to and remained
with the donee or some person holding for or under him."
Prior to the revision of the Code in 1931 a statute" provided
that a gift of goods or chattels should be valid only if it were
made either by deed or will, or unless there had been actual de-
livery of the property. This former statute apparently merely
codified the prevailing common law in the Virginias. In Ross v.
of any covenant or warranty or other agreement therein contained, whether
such instrument be sealed or unsealed, and every estoppel which would have
been created by such writing, if sealed, shall be created by it, though it be
unsealed. Such action of covenant may also be maintained upon any contract
or agreement for the conveyance of any interest in land, which interest, if
conveyed, would be required by said section one, article one of this chapter
to be conveyed by deed".
"See RevisersI Note, supra n. 45.
"'W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 5. The words "9goods and
chattels" within the meaning of this section include money, and every other
hind of personal property, which may be the subject of gifts inter vivos or
causa mortis. Dickesehied v. Exchange Bank, 28 W. Va. 340, 368 (1886).
o Ibid.
'W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 71, § 1, N .... o gift of any goods or
chattels shall be valid, unless by deed, or will, or unless actual possession shall
have come and remained with the donee, or some person claiming under him.)
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Milne" we find the usual rule stated that a parol contract to pay a
certain sum of money to a donee could not be enforced by the
donee (certainly not in an action of debt, although the language
used by the Court was broad enough to include an action of as-
sumpsit as well) in the absence of either consideration, delivery,
or the existence of an instrument under seal. The Court said, per
Tucker, P. J. :t'
"To give her (the donee) any right whatever, there must
either have been an executed gift, or a valuable consideration.
A gift without consideration confers a right, provided it is
complete by delivery; and a grant, though incomplete, will
confer a right if there be a valuable consideration. Thus,
not only does a gift to a child, accompanied by possession,
pass the title, but if one give chattels by deed, and deliver the
deed to the use of the donee, though a volunteer, the goods and
chattels are immediately in the donee . . . For the deed is
an executed contract; it passes all title out of the grantor,
even without the delivery of possession."
Clearly then, in the light of the earlier statute and case law
prevailing in West Virginia, the Revisers of the Code of 1931 had
a direct purpose in providing that "No seal shall be necessary to
give validity to a gift of goods or chattels by writing". As ex-
plained in the Revisers' Note to the section," the seal had become
no longer necessary in order to give validity to a conveyance of
land. "It would tend to confusion if a different and stricter re-
quirement were retained for gifts of personal property than for
conveyances of land." Consequently, the words "written instru-
ment" were substituted for the word "deed" in the section in
question.
When we notice types of sealed contracts other than those
involving gifts of personal property we find - with few excep-
tions - slight statutory changes in West Virginia. One of these
exceptions is the promissory note. The general common law rule
was that a seal affixed to a negotiable note converted the note into
a non-negotiable bond or specialty.' This rule apparently pre-
212 Leigh (Va.) 201 (1841).
mTbid at 219.
"Revisers' Note, W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 5.
'Ex parte First Nat. Bank of Ozark, 212 Ala. 274, 102 So. 371 (1924) in
which the Court said "Prior to the adoption in this state of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law. . . ., this court had always recognized the dis-
tinctions impressed by the common law and the Statute of Anne on in-
struments given under seal, and though a promise to pay money were in the
exact form of a negotiable promissory note, it was held that its execution
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vailed in West Virginia.' But at all events the adoption of the
Negotiable Instruments Law in 1907 1 sounded the final kmell to
the seal as affecting the negotiability of the note to which it might
be affixed. Seemingly, the only legal consequence in West Vir-
ginia that the affixing of a seal now has upon a negotiable instru-
ment is to extend the period within which suit upon it can be
brought."'
Our study, therefore, has shown that vital statutory changes
have been made in the case of sealed instruments falling within
the following classes: (1) those employed in real estate transfers,
as discussed previously, (2) those employed in transferring gifts
of personal property, and (3) those within the meaning of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. It is our belief that, except in the
foregoing cases, the affixing of a seal to a paper carries with it in
this State the same legal consequences as was the case prior to the
legislation of 1921 and the subsequent clarification by the Revised
Code of 1931. To this statement perhaps the following qualifica-
tion should be added. Statutes have allowed certain defenses to
sealed instruments at law which formerly were available only in
equity. These defenses will be considered in the section of our
study immediately following.
The Problem of Consideration in Contracts Under Seal
The problem of consideration in the case of sealed instru-
ments long has been the subject of much discussion by legal
scholars. This discussion for the most part has resulted from the
use by the courts of the unfortunate expression, "a seal imports
consideration". Clearly, such was not the theory of the early Eng-
lish common law. Private seals were used long before the action
of assumpsit developed, with the resulting emphasis on the doc-
trine of consideration. But, as Professor Williston points out,'
under the seal of the maker destroyed its character in law as a promissory
note, and made of it an obligation legally different and distinct, a specialty,
usually called a bill single or writing obligatory, carrying a conclusive pre-
sumption of a valid consideration for the obligation to pay, and not negotiable
under the principles of the law merchant, or the provisions of the Statute of
Anne, making promissory notes negotiable."
'Laidley's Admr'rs v. Bright's Adm'r, 17 W. Va. 779 (1881); Keller,
Adm'r v. McHuffman, supra n. 17.
11W. VA. REV. Conu (1931) c. 46.
5 Ibid, art. 1, § 6 (d).
5imbid, c. 55, art. 2, § 6. This section provides a ten year statute of limita-
tions on contracts under seal. In Maslin's Ex'rs v. Hiett, 37 W. Vh. 15, 16
S. E. 437 (1892) an action on a promissory note not under seal was held to
be barred after five years.
1 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 217.
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"after the action of assumpsit had been developed, the somewhat
unfortunate mode of expression became usual that a sealed in-
strument 'imported' a consideration. It would have been more
accurate to have said that no consideration was needed for such a
document. But, however expressed, the law always has been clear
that apart from the changes made by statute, a sealed promise,
whether absolute or in the form of an offer, is binding without
consideration." Such certainly is the present trend of authority.
The American Law Institute, for example, in its Restatement of
Contracts says simply that a sealed contract does not need con-
sideration.' Thus, once more we have a statement of the pure
English common law on the point. It is the form of the instru-
ment which places it entirely outside the category of those re-
quiring the mystical element of consideration in order to be
legally enforceable.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has generally
employed language to the effect that on the law side a seal "pre-
sumes" or "imports" a consideration. In Bolyard v. Bolyard,"
for example, the Court said, per Poffenbarger, J.:"
"As the instrument is under seal, a consideration is
presumed . .. ."
And in National Valley Bank v. Houston," the Supreme
Court, this time through Miller, J., observed that!
"In the first place, the contract being under seal, im-
ported a consideration ... "
However, on the equity side, the Court has never recognized
the presence of a seal as "importing" or dispensing with consid-
eration. In Eclipse Oil Go. v. South& Penn Oil Go. it was said:
"The fourth contention of the plaintiff is that its lease
is not a nudum pactum, without consideration, and void by
reason thereof. It insists that it is made under seal, which
imports a consideration, and that a party to it cannot avoid
it for this reason. This would be true at law .... It is not
true in equity."
IContracts Restatement (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 110: "It is not essential in
order to make a promise under seal operative as a sealed contract that con-
sideration be given for the promise."
79 W. Va. 554, 91 S. E. 529 (1917).
" Ibi at 558.
66 W. Va. 336, 66 S. B. 465 (1909).
MIbid at 348.
47 W. 'Va. 84, 98, 34 S. E. 923 (1899).
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Perhaps the best way to determine to what extent West Vir-
ginia has modified the pure English common law doctrine of con-
sideration with respect to sealed instruments will be in noticing
what matters of defense may be raised in a suit on such an instru-
ment. Professor Ames points out that "the general rule that the
misconduct of the obligee in procuring or enforcing a specialty
obligation was no bar at common law upon the instrument was
subject to one exception.' That exception was duress. Even
the defense of illegality was not permitted prior to 1767, unless
the illegality appeared on the face of the instrument itself."
Fraud in the procurement of the instrument could not be pleaded
as a matter of defense in action on the instrument." Instead, the
defendant was obliged either to pursue his independent action at
law to recover the damage he had suffered by the fraud, or else
seek to enjoin in equity an action on the instrument thus fraud-
ulently procured. The defenses of payment and of accord and
satisfaction were likewise originally unavailable in an action at
law on a specialty.' At first equitable intervention was allowed
in such instances. Eventually a statute made such defenses valid
at law. ' And finally, neither want of consideration, nor failure
of consideration could be shown at common law.m
Many of the foregoing rules have been changed by statute in
West Virginia. The Revised Code of 1931r provides in part:
"In any action on a contraat, the defendant may file a
plea alleging any such failure in the consideration of the con-
tract, or fraud in its procurement, .... or any other matter,
as would entitle him either to recover damages at law from
the plaintiff, or the person under whom the plaintiff claims,
or to relief in equity, in whole or in part, against the obliga-
tion of the contract; or, if the contract be by deed, alleging
any such matter existing before its execution, or any such
mistake therein, or in the execution thereof, or any such other
matter, as would entitle him to such relief in equity; ... 
2
7A.mEs, LECTURES ON LEAL HISTORY (1913) at 113.
"bid at 107.
'Wyche v. Macklin, 2 Rand. (Va.) 426 (1824); National Valley Bank v.
Houston, supra n. 64 at 347.
' AmEs, op. cit. supra n. 67 at 106.
!T-bid at 109-111.
12 7bd.
73 Tomlinson's Adm'r v. Mason, 6 Rand. (Va.) 169 (1828). See Williamson v.
Cline, 40 W. Va. 194, 205, 20 S. E. 917 (1895).
10. 56, art. 5, § 8. (CODE 1849, c. 172, § 5; CODE 1860, c. 172, § 5; CODE
1868, c. 126, § 5; CODE 1923, c. 126, § 5).
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As this division of our study is devoted to the matter of con-
sideration in sealed instruments, it seems best to limit strictly our
discussion of the foregoing statute to that problem. In Fisher v.
BurdetFt the Supreme Court of Appeals held that the statute
covered "contracts under seal as well as contracts by parol".
Consequently it affirmed a judgment which allowed a defendant to
file a plea alleging failure of the consideration stipulated in a con-
tract under seal. However, this is as far as the Supreme Court of
Appeals has gone in the direction of expanding common law
principles by statutory interpretation. In Willianson v. Cline'
the Court refused to permit want of valuable consideration to be
raised as a defense where the instrument sued on was under seal.
In that case the Court said, per Brannon, J. :'
"As just stated, failure of consideration may be shown
under that statute as defense to a sealed instrument. Fisher
v. Burdette, 21 W. Va. 626. We must, under that section
.... draw the line of distinction between want of considera-
tion and failure of consideration, as they are different. The
words 'failure in the consideration', used in that section, re-
fer to contracts where originally there was consideration sub-
sequently failing, not to contracts wholly wanting considera-
tion at their execution."
Thus, the Supreme Court of Appeals left the defense of want
of consideration where it always has been in West Virginia -
controlled by the principles of the common law. As we have seen,
this means that a contract under seal does not require considera-
tion to make it legally effective. And such is the real result
reached by the West Virginia cases regardless of the fact that the
Supreme Court of Appeals prefers to talk in terms of a seal "im-
porting" or "presuming" a consideration.
Conclusion
In the introductory paragraph to this paper two important
questions were raised, (1) what is the legal effect of the private
seal in West Virginia, and (2) what need, for the private seal if
any, still exists in the state ?
We believe that our study substantiates the following answers
to the first question:
(a) A seal attached to any instrument conveying or agree-
ing to convey any interest in land has no legal effect whatever.
-21 W. Va. 626 (1883).
"Supra n. 73 at 205, 206.
" Ibid at 206.
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(b) A seal attached to a lease of real estate for a term of
more than five years, or to an agreement to make such a lease, has
no legal effect whatever. A seal is still essential on a lease of real
estate for five year or less, or on an agreement to make such a
lease, if an action of covenant is to be maintained on the lease.
(c) A seal attached to a writing conveying goods or chat-
tels by gift has no legal effect whatever.
(d) A seal attached to a negotiable promissory note has no
legal effect whatever on the negotiable character of the instru-
ment. Apparently the only legal effect resulting from the affixing
of such a seal is to extend the period within which suit can be
brought on the instrument.
(e) Except in the foregoing cases, a seal still possesses in
West Virginia today its great common law incident - it is a sub-
stitute for consideration. And, while a statute permits the maker
of a sealed instrument to show by way of defense that the con-
sideration stipulated for in the instrument has failed, he is not
permitted to show that valuable consideration was wholly wanting
at the time the instrument was made.
Any answer to the second of the foregoing questions will de-
pend to a decided degree on opinion. It is our opinion that there
is great need for the private seal as a substitute for consideration
in certain kinds of contracts. The following paragraph written by
a legal scholar in our neighboring state of Pennsylvania,"' sum-
marizes precisely our viewse in the matter:
"It is extremely useful to the community and to the
legal profession to have an abracadabra by which a promise
may be made legally binding without the uncertainty of prov-
ing consideration. In the absence of some magic token a
creditor cannot release a liquidated, undisputed debt upon
payment of less than is then due, despite the fact that it is
frequently sound economic policy for him so to do. At the
other end of the scale, perhaps, is the charitable subscription
which is most conveniently substantiated by a seal. Not to
mention those cases where there is grave doubt as to whether
or not there is consideration for the agreement and here again
the seal is a lifesaver to the hard-pressed lawyer . .. ."
Consequently, we suggest that the Legislature make no further
inroads on the legal position of the private seal in West Virginia.
"Reeve, The Uniform W itten Obligations Act (1928) 76 U. PA. L. REV.
580, 581.
WBilig, The Troblem of Consideration in Charitalble Subscriptions (1927)
12 CORN. L. Q. 467, reprinted in SELECTED RsmNas ON THE LAw op CON-
TRcss (1931) at 542.
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